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Abstract
Informed by an understanding that the quest for autonomy can serve as 
a compass of Brazil’s foreign policy, this paper undertakes an extensive 
interpretative analysis of the concept in relation to the agency/structure 
debate. Our aim is to use these theoretical tools to analyse Brazil’s international 
action during the 21st century, paying special attention to Bolsonaro’s 
administration. This article argues that we are witnessing a dual break in 
autonomy: an essentially structural break related to the underlying trends 
currently redesigning the international world as we know it, and another more 
agential break, resulting from president Bolsonaro’s particular worldview.
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Historians describe historical events as 
resulting from the will of an individual: 
Caesar, Napoleon, Bismarck, etc. However, 
to say that a hundred thousand people died 
in Russia, slaughtering one other because one 
or two people wanted it that way, is as absurd 
as saying that a mined mountain of a million 




Historically, Brazilian diplomacy, as embodied by Itamaraty, has enjoyed a highly prestigious status in the international 
arena. As a result, Brazil has been regarded as a diplomatic power 
Sergio Caballero¹
¹Universidad de Deusto Facultad de 
Ciencias Sociales y Humanas, International 
Relations, Bilbao, Spain 
(sergio.caballero@deusto.es).
 ORCID ID:  
orcid.org/0000-0002-5244-1647
Diego Crescentino²
²Autonomous University of Madrid, 
Historia, Madrid, Spain 
(diego.crescentino@uam.es).
 ORCID ID:  
orcid.org/0000-0002-0780-199X
Article
From the quest for autonomy to the dual break: structural and agential changes in Brazil’s foreign policy during the 21st century
Rev. Bras. Polít. Int., 63(1): e011, 2020 Caballero; Crescentino  
2
and has benefited from the pervasive perception that the country exercises its capacities through 
diplomatic channels to settle conflicts and achieve peaceful resolutions. Ultimately, Brazilian 
diplomacy and, more specifically, Brazil’s foreign policy, have traditionally been subordinated to 
a higher-level goal — to promote Brazil’s development — through an intermediary objective – 
greater autonomy in decision-making on the international stage.
Brazil’s priorities in foreign policy have fluctuated, influenced as much by the systemic 
context as by presidential charisma and leadership (Danese 1999). Nevertheless, there has been 
continuity in the centrality and ambition that Brazil’s foreign policy has conferred upon itself both 
in its role as a vehicle for change (agency capacity), and a means of giving form to the explanatory 
narrative surrounding Brazil’s needs in the world (generation of performative discourse). This 
dual normative dimension of actorness and performance has contributed to bolstering Itamaraty’s 
prestige, as well as the widely lauded professionalisation and autonomy commonly attributed 
to Brazilian diplomacy. This necessitates a more nuanced and precise understanding than the 
commonly cited “quest for autonomy” as part of the DNA of Brazilian diplomacy.  
On the other hand, in the current international context, Jair Bolsonaro’s administration has not 
only implemented changes in how Itamaraty operates, but has also called for a “de-ideologisation” 
of Brazil’s foreign policy1, while paradoxically introducing one of the most deeply ideological 
biases into Brazil’s external action that the country has ever witnessed. This vision incorporates the 
unconditional alignment between presidents Bolsonaro and Trump, a reduction in Brazil’s aspirations 
to be a global player (Malamud 2011; Caballero 2011) and a reductionist and economically 
pragmatic foreign policy adopted as a crisis response measure (Caballero 2019a).
Informed by an understanding that the quest for autonomy can serve as a compass of Brazil’s 
foreign policy, this paper undertakes an extensive interpretative analysis of the concept in relation to 
the agency-structure debate. Although distinct theoretical approaches have engaged with the agency-
structure problem in various ways (Caballero 2019b), the majority of theories concur that there is a 
kind of interrelation between these two elements. We adopt a structurationist approach à la Giddens 
(1979), in which the agent has the capacity to make decisions and partially modify reality, yet always 
constrained by existing social structures. Despite this mutual feedback between agent and structure, 
a distinction can be made between long-lasting structures embedded in institutions, values and ideas 
(Cox 1996) and malleable stakeholders anchored to passionate and selfish human behaviours.
This article seeks to make a theoretical contribution to Brazil’s foreign policy by combining 
a longitudinal qualitative research method with an extensive review on the literature related to the 
concept of autonomy. Through this conceptualisation, our aim is to engage more effectively with 
research questions on the evolution of Brazilian foreign policy’s structural and conjunctural shifts 
throughout the 21st century, paying special attention to Bolsonaro’s administration operating in 
an uncertain global context.
1 As Bolsonaro himself argued in his first international appearance in Davos 2019, the “ideological vein [of Brazil’s foreign policy] would 
cease to exist” (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2019).
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The theoretical and conceptual debates surrounding autonomy 
There have been various studies focused on analysing the axes and underlying assumptions 
that govern Brazil’s foreign policy. Generally speaking, the explanatory paradigms formulated 
have been the products of a persistent diplomatic tradition: a set of principles understood as part 
of the country’s historical heritage and intrinsically linked to its behaviour on the international 
stage. This accumulated history (Cervo 2008), or legacy of a diplomatic tradition (Lafer 2001, 
20), is indicative of trends which persist in spite of the successive changes and fluctuations in 
foreign policy (Silva 1998, 142). The literature on the subject has generally highlighted certain 
constants, such as universal vocation; Brazil’s ambition to become a key actor in international 
politics through multilateralism; pacificism; non-interventionism; defending the sovereign equality 
of states; non-confrontation; self-determination; legalism; and pragmatism (Silva 1998; Ricupero 
2000; Lima 2005; Amorim Neto and Malamud 2015). Other studies have attempted to update 
these concepts by analysing to what extent attitudes and behaviours have remained consistent over 
time, concluding that Brazil’s external action exhibits a degree of continuity. This has led to the 
incorporation of these historic principles into the 1988 constitution, enshrining a set of values 
which establish Brazil as a member of the international community, such as democracy, human 
rights, environmental concerns, non-proliferation and anti-organised crime measures (Lampreia 
1998, 14).
Despite certain critiques, there is a broad consensus regarding the existence of high levels of 
professionalisation, autonomy and bureaucratic isolation, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ 
monopoly on the design and execution of foreign policy (Cason and Power 2009, 119-120). In 
turn, members of Brazil’s specialised foreign policy academic community also subscribe to this 
consensus regarding Brazil’s ambition to play an influential role on the international stage, but are 
divided on which mechanisms should be employed to achieve this objective: one group espouses 
that the country should strengthen its position through participation in the formulation of global 
regulations and institutions; the other emphasises the search for autonomy through collaboration 
with similar countries in Latin America (Giacalone 2012, 338).  However, as Cervo (2003, 13) 
points out, these two strategies were never exclusive or in conflict with each other; rather, they 
provided, through dialogue and interpenetration, a mixed model of development.
Ultimately, as Lima (2005) states, the importance of any belief or idea is not so much that 
it is false or true, but rather that it is held to be true by important groups within a community. 
In the long term, epistemic communities must interact with decision-makers if they wish to 
defend and justify specific principles, and this ultimately results in a significant impact on policy 
formulation. Moreover, if they are part of and interact with academic communities, as is the case 
with the Itamaraty school, the impacts are greater still. 
In this vein, various explanations or lines of interpretation regarding Brazil’s external action 
have emerged concurrently with the delineation of these fundamental principles, resulting in the 
formulation of distinct foreign policy paradigms. These diplomatic action theories have been 
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formulated around an integrated set of base ideas which act as cognitive maps, making the 
complexity of the world that surrounds Itamaraty more comprehensible (Silva 1998, 141). They 
seek to use both domestic and systemic variables to explain external behaviour, with a view to 
analysing foreign policy as a whole, disregarding abnormal behaviour (Milani et al. 2017, 596-597) 
and formulating a model with an explanatory logic capable of accounting for new behaviour. 
As Milani et al. (2017) illustrate, these paradigms have been formulated along three lines of 
interpretation: the dichotomy between Americanists (pragmatic and ideological) and globalists 
(Hobbesians and Grotians) (Lima 1994; Silva 1995; Pinheiro 2000), national development policy 
(Lafer 2001; Cervo 2003) and the quest for autonomy (Hurrell 1986; Fonseca Jr 1998; Vigevani 
and Cepaluni 2009).
The concept of autonomy thus became one of the most fruitful and recurrent explanatory 
concepts when analysing South American foreign policy. This has led authors such as Briceño Ruiz 
and Simonoff (2017) to assert that the concept of autonomy constitutes one of South America’s 
most significant contributions to the discipline of International Relations. Understood in this way 
and despite interpretations according to which, until 1980, Brazil’s foreign policy was informed 
by an uncritical and one-dimensional analysis of diplomatic history, the theoretical proposal of 
autonomy was a crucial contributing factor to escaping the determinism of dependency theory 
(Giacalone 2012, 336). However, a more nuanced (re)formulation emerged following the end 
of the Cold War, resulting in various schools of thought on the understanding of the concept. 
First of all, this interpretation is, in part, a subsidiary analysis of another. Autonomy was 
framed as an intermediate objective, subordinated to the ultimate objective of foreign policy: the 
promotion of national development. Autonomy serves to prevent a country having to obey orders 
from foreign actors, while development serves to foster endogenous capacities (Malamud 2011, 
175). Second, autonomy, as an explanatory narrative for Brazilian external action since 1930, 
served as an ideal channel to generate a performative discourse. Foreign policy academics then 
used this narrative to frame Itamaraty as a central vehicle of change (agent) for Brazil’s dependent 
status at the international level. This conceptualisation was integrated into the aforementioned 
bureaucratic tradition of continuity and professionalism, through which the institutional history 
of the Ministry was interpreted as external to the ideological swings of central governments 
(Cheibub 1985). 
Thus, a variety of theoretical explanatory constructs were formulated around this premise, 
ones which apply as much to conservative as they do to liberal or social democratic governments, 
and both democratic and authoritarian ones. These include: pragmatic equidistance (Vargas), 
autonomy within dependence (Vargas), autonomy through industrialisation or through pendulum 
(Vargas), responsible and ecumenical pragmatism (Geisel), autonomy through distance (Geisel) 
and through participation (Collor de Melo, Franco, Cardoso), autonomy through modernisation 
(Collor de Melo) and through integration (Cardoso), and autonomy through diversification or 
through coalition (Lula da Silva), to name a few. These conceptualisations could only become 
congruent with the historical narrative of continuity in the autonomist sense by making the 
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concept more malleable. As Fonseca Jr. (1998, 361) points out, definitions of autonomy have 
varied across historical and spatial contexts and in accordance with the interests and positions of 
powerful groups. 
Helio Jaguaribe (1979), one of the founding theorists of the Instituto Superior de Estudos 
Brasileiros (ISEB) laid the foundations for the systematisation of the debate on this subject 
as it relates to the Brazilian context. Jaguaribe claimed that the Cold War engendered a 
hierarchical system of international stratification that consisted of four levels of diminishing 
capacity for self-determination: 1) general primacy, 2) regional primacy, 3) autonomy, and 4) 
dependency. Within this structure, a country’s level of autonomy depends on two factors: on 
the one hand there are enabling requirements, such as national viability (material, human and 
technological resources) and international permissiveness (geopolitical capacity to neutralise 
the risk from possible aggressors and to impose material and moral penalties through both 
economic-military and diplomatic measures). On the other hand, exercising requirements, 
which offered peripheral countries two routes to autonomy: the increasingly complex and 
unattainable domestic technical-business autonomy, or by taking advantage of the existence of 
a favourable intra-imperial relationship, possibly by way of an ethnic-cultural identification 
with the values of the hegemonic centre. These theoretical developments allowed for the 
identification of distinct levels of autonomous self-determination: general, regional (restricted 
to a region) or sectoral (exercised at the economic level, by virtue of comparative advantages) 
(Jaguaribe 1979, 91-93, 128). 
In a similar vein but with the distinction of making a direct reference to the definition 
of countries’ international action, Gerson Moura explained that foreign policy is conditioned 
by the power structure in which the country is located, as well as by the domestic and external 
political contexts (specifically, the immediate decision-making processes in both the hegemonic 
centre and dependent countries). Consequently, foreign policy is conditioned both by structural 
determinations, which delimited decision-makers’ scope action, as well as agential determinations, 
produced by policymakers’ decisions and actions (Moura 1980, 42-43). 
According to Hurrell’s 1986 doctoral thesis, autonomy is a relational concept. This means 
that a country’s status is defined with reference to a continuum between two ideal typological 
behaviours: autonomy and dependence. This does not mean, however, that greater autonomy 
implies withdrawal from the international system towards an autarchic model. In fact, in Hurrell’s 
understanding, autonomous behaviour is not necessarily incompatible with a high degree of 
participation in the international political and economic system. Instead, autonomy implies the 
ability to independently and consistently determine national policies, resist attempts at external 
control, flexibly adapt to and exploit favourable trends in the international context, and limit 
and control the effects of unfavourable trends. However, Hurrell highlights that a distinctive 
contextual feature of Brazilian foreign policy was the conscious decision to prioritise other objectives, 
particularly economic development, over forging a more extensive international role or seeking 
to maximise autonomy and independence (Hurrell 2014, 38-42).
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Hurrell’s theorisation was, therefore, ahead of its time, in the sense that it made a partial break 
with previous theoretical constructions which were deeply influenced by realist interpretations 
of the Cold War context. The end of Communism brought with it new schools of thought that 
sought to understand this new context for action, a context which, according to Russell and Tokatlian 
(2002), rendered the traditional conceptualisation of autonomy obsolete. Their response was to 
propose a shift from an antagonistic autonomy, as a country’s power to isolate itself and control 
external processes and events, to a notion of relational autonomy, constructed within a context of 
relationships and defined as a country’s capacity to productively participate in and exert influence 
on global politics. This resulted in an understanding of autonomy as countries’ capacity and political 
willingness to make decisions both independently and in cooperation with other countries, in order 
to resolve global issues collaboratively, thus decreasing asymmetries of power through competent, 
active, committed and responsible participation (Russell and Tokatlian 2002, 175-180). This gave 
a theoretical foundation to the earlier formulation of Fonseca Jr., who made a distinction between 
Brazil’s external action in the pre- and post-Cold War periods, as autonomy through distance and 
autonomy through participation, respectively (Fonseca Jr. 1998, 353-374). This distinction was termed 
isolationist autonomy and autonomy by integration by Lampreia (1998, 11) and Lafer (2000, 263).
Incorporating this reading into their analysis of Brazilian foreign policy, Vigevani and Cepaluni 
view autonomy as a condition which allows states to implement decisions based on their own 
political objectives, without external interference or restriction, by way of their capacity to control 
processes and events beyond their own borders. In doing so, they added a third stage (Lula da Silva’s 
autonomy through diversification) to the earlier distinction between autonomy through distance 
(autarchic economic development through a distancing from major international problems and 
the search for South-South alliances) and autonomy through participation (acceptance of liberal 
norms and international regimes in the hope of obtaining long-term influence on and participation 
in the decision-making processes of international institutions). They defined this additional stage 
in terms of international insertion through alignment with countries in the global South in the 
hope of finding multilateral solutions (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2009). 
As we have seen, the concept of autonomy remains in the foreground for both the epistemic 
communities focused on the study of Brazilian foreign policy and Itamaraty’s institutional discourse. 
This has not, however, prevented criticisms regarding the way the concept is employed, such 
as those made by Lessa et al. (2010) and Lima and Pinheiro (2018), which, in addition to the 
idiosyncrasies of each study, have paved the way for the delineation of two general trends in the 
interpretation of autonomy’s role in Brazil’s foreign policy. In this sense, as Bueno (1980, 122) 
states, the History (HIR) and Theory (TIR) of international relations are both concerned with 
the same empirical subject, yet they are divided in their conceptual approaches: while the HIR 
is interested in the singularity, subjected to the force of time, TIR is concerned with the present 
and seeks to formulate scientific generalisations and typifications. These epistemic communities 
are, of course, in constant exchange, complicating and enriching the debate with new theoretical 
propositions, yet each has developed its own approach.
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On the one hand, the Brasília2 and São Paulo schools base their understanding on Cervo 
and Bueno’s formulation of structural process within Brazil’s IR, thereby revealing its historical 
“profound forces” (in the terms of Renouvin). Following on from Cervo’s theorisation on national 
concepts, Brasília and São Paulo scholars are committed to the nation-building-and-branding 
process. However, by framing development as a vector of foreign policy, their understanding 
retains the primacy of the unitary state as an international actor, while simultaneously combining 
Itamaraty’s diplomatic discourse with Brazilian foreign policy itself (Santos 2005, 26). Consistent 
with the narrative of an independent Itamaraty elaborated by Rio Branco, their understanding of 
Brazilian foreign policy has normally been defined by understanding the concept of autonomy 
as continuity.
On the other hand, the Rio de Janeiro school is based on the ideas outlined by Maria Regina 
Soares de Lima and Gerson Moura, and is institutionally centred on the University Research 
Institute (IUPERJ), the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) and, more 
recently, the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ). From an IR and Political Science perspective, 
their work seeks to inquire into Brazilian foreign policy by deepening its understanding as a public 
policy, thereby unveiling the plurality of actors and agendas involved in the foreign policy-making 
process. As a result, their reading – and indeed, the one from which this paper derives - has tackled 
the agency-structure IR debate in order to explore an interpretation of autonomy in terms of 
discontinuity.
This does not prevent researchers from Brasília, such as Lessa et al. (2010), from being 
critical of their school’s own tradition and advocating for the understanding of autonomy as a 
discursive construction, which, combined with the diplomatic rhetoric, has made the work of 
Brazilian foreign policy analysts more difficult. Continuing in this vein, these authors criticise the 
fact that, due to a need to adapt to explanatory concepts, an attempt has been made to explain the 
dynamics of Brazil’s international insertion using exogenous categories, thereby moving the axis 
of causality out of the country. Their criticism goes even further, by examining the nature of the 
literature produced in relation to the interests of the diplomatic corps which occupied Itamaraty 
from 1985 onwards. According to Lessa et al. (2010, 356-357), the construction and application 
of two distinct and opposing categories (distance and participation) in two different historical 
moments (the Cold War and the new world order, respectively) aided the consolidation of an 
image of the country as one that had progressed away from the military regime, and was now 
focused on the formulation of global regulations. However, this had dangerous implications for 
academia, as it excluded alternative narratives and causalities, while simultaneously reproducing 
the diplomatic rhetoric. 
In fact, Lessa et al.’s (2010) analysis was important for two reasons. First, it was one of the 
first studies to criticise the concept of autonomy as continuity, a notion which had been a constant 
2 In the terms of Bernal-Meza (2013), an epistemic community generated around the interaction between the University of Brasília and 
Itamaraty, to which we add the support provided by the São Paulo State University (UNESP).
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in Itamaraty’s identity since the works of Hurrell (1986) and one which was reproduced by Fonseca 
Jr. (1998) and Vigevani and Cepaluni, (2009). This previously uncontested mainstream reading 
was thus critiqued through an empirical analysis of Brazilian diplomacy’s multilateral behaviour. 
Informed by an awareness of the distinction between autonomy through distance and autonomy 
through participation, this analysis examined the makeup of specific autonomist moments in 
the history of Brazil’s foreign policy. Second, and indirectly, their empirical analysis provided a 
crucial counterpoint to Russell and Tokatlian’s (2002) notion of relational autonomy, by analysing 
how the changes in Brazilian diplomacy’s behaviour did not coincide with the appearance of the 
new context for action which emerged in the immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War. 
Such a proposal led authors such as Saraiva (2014) to question the usefulness of the concept of 
autonomy as an analytical category for post-Cold War governments, particularly in the cases of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff.
Subsequent studies responded to these considerations by returning to an understanding 
of autonomy as subordinate to domestic development. Spektor (2014) has taken up the 
relationship between autonomy and the notion of national viability emphasised by Jaguaribe. 
In this conceptualisation, foreign policy is subordinated to a higher-level goal of increasing 
national elites’ room for manoeuvre and negotiating power within a regional system characterised 
by American hegemony and an asymmetrical international system. For Spektor, autonomy is 
ultimately manifested in the search for national development driven by industrial modernisation, 
with a view to developing a form of national capitalism that adheres to global capitalism while 
remaining autonomous. Consequently, he succeeds in distinguishing five autonomist strategies 
(balancing, diversification, coalition building, distancing and belonging), applied during three 
historical phases and with a strong theoretical basis in the propositions previously outlined by 
Fonseca Jr. (1998) and Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009).
Mariano (2015) conducts an additional subsidiary analysis of the concept of relational 
autonomy, in which autonomy is understood as a constant search to increase the room for manoeuvre 
and the capacity to influence and make decisions within the international system. However, 
despite adopting Vigevani and Cepaluni’s historical periodisation (2009), the author recognises 
that, discursively, autonomy has taken various forms, depending on the political context in which 
it emerges. This is due to the fact that concepts constructed by the diplomatic corps have been 
used to interpret reality in such a way as to enable the planning of organisational adaptation in 
the face of shifts in the political environment. In turn, this has reinforced the idea of continuity 
and recreated the conditions necessary for it to emerge. From this perspective, the narrative of 
autonomy is understood as a constant diplomatic attempt to obtain favourable conditions in 
which to exercise autonomy (Mariano 2015, 44-45). 
Finally, Lima and Pinheiro (2018) have succeeded in bringing together the various strands of 
criticism related to Russell and Tokatlian’s (2002) concept. The authors posit that, by understanding 
the autonomist strategy as a search for sovereignty, the conceptualisation of relational autonomy 
leads to a loss of the concept of autonomy’s original analytical value. This is due to the fact that, 
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as this concept does not differentiate between individual states’ behaviour, it loses its normative 
value as a differential political objective of foreign policy strategies adopted by countries located 
on the periphery of the global power system and the capitalist order. Lima and Pinheiro’s analysis, 
on the other hand, differentiates between two autonomist behaviours: situational/contextual 
autonomy and behavioural autonomy. This is made possible by emphasising the importance of 
agency as a driving force and a central element, both in disadvantageous contexts of systemic 
dependency and in situations of systemic opportunity and national viability.
Ultimately, and in line with Bernal-Meza (2013, 212), autonomy is understood as a condition 
constructed by agential decisions. This is a consequence of the fact that, in situations in which 
systematic conditions constrain a country’s room for manoeuvre, only by having a capacity to 
exercise agency can a country alleviate the unfavourable conditions its peripheral position entails 
(Lima and Pinheiro 2018, 18). This observation is present in the original formulation of the concept 
of autonomy as opposed to dependency (Giacalone 2012, 337). Lima and Pinheiro (2018), like 
Lessa et al. (2010) and Mariano (2015), understand that the shift in meaning towards relational 
autonomy has become a diplomatic strategy intended to validate the narrative of continuity 
in foreign policy. By constantly qualifying the concept, academic communities have failed to 
recognise that, rather than constituting continuity, the search for autonomy has been the axis 
during moments of rupture in Brazilian foreign policy.
Brazil’s foreign policy in the 21st century: autonomy and dual break
The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a convergence between certain agential and 
structural phenomena, which contributed to a heightened leadership role for Brazil on the 
international stage (Lima and Pinheiro 2018, 14). On the one hand, there was the election of Lula 
da Silva as president (2003-2010), who was particularly active in international politics and had 
the charisma needed to conduct meetings and negotiate with the most important world leaders. 
This was linked to the consolidation of a “Petista sub-family” in the heart of Itamaraty marshalled 
by Celso Amorim and Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães and profoundly connected with Planalto 
through the presidential advisor for international affairs, Marco Aurelio Garcia. This connection 
fomented the synergies necessary to allow Brazil to become a global player. On the other hand, 
from a structural perspective, the emergence of BRICS, in conjunction with the decline of the 
unipolarism of the 1990s, created the space necessary for the irruption of new actors (“the rise 
of the rest”), and also moved Latin America beyond the radar of the United States. As a result, 
Latin American countries were able to develop their own regional strategies — particularly ones 
related to post-liberal/post-hegemonic regionalism paradigms —, as well as their aspirations at 
the global level: in the South American context, Brazil had a crucial role in both.
Specifically, these aspirations for a greater degree of autonomy have been channelled at the 
regional level through a reorganisation of MERCOSUR in 2003 to incorporate a more pluralistic 
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agenda and a greater role for the state, in addition to the gestation of the South American 
Community of Nations (2004) and the subsequent UNASUR (2008), which centred on the 
formation of regional infrastructures and the promotion of geopolitical stability. This strengthening 
of Brazil’s regional role, its large internationalised companies and, ultimately, the promotion of 
stability and predictability in the region, has helped Brazil to increase its room for manoeuvre (and 
legitimacy) on the international stage.3 In short, the efforts to both build and re-establish regional 
integration organisations, such as MERCOSUR and UNASUR, and to become the architect of 
IBSA and BRICS, corroborate the existence of this new direction in Brazil’s international political 
action. However, while Brazil was proactive in maintaining its leader status at the regional level, 
at the global level it preferred to form new coalitions with stronger partners. Unable to take the 
lead in these processes, Brazil sought to take advantage of its oscillating position between the 
‘Lion of the Status Quo’ (United States) and the ‘Revisionist Wolf ’ (China), in the hope that this 
would translate into relative gains (Rodriguez 2012, 85-86). 
As Danese (1999) argues, understanding presidential leadership is fundamental to 
understanding Brazilian foreign policy. In fact, Burges and Bastos (2017) distinguish a clear contrast 
between the political capital invested by presidents Collor de Melo (1990-92), Cardoso (1995-2002) 
and Lula (2003-2010) (while recognising that each instance presents its own idiosyncrasies), and 
the kind of inertia in or neglect of foreign policy development experienced under the regimes of 
Itamar Franco (1992-1994) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016).
However, this agential factor, taken in isolation, is in itself insufficient to account for the 
success of Brazil’s foreign policy. Despite the undeniable political successes achieved during Lula’s 
presidency, Brazil’s image as a model to follow both in the region and among the emerging powers 
was largely due to a benevolent international economic situation; in an example of a favourable 
convergence between agency and structure present during the period 2003-2013, Brazil, like many 
other countries, benefited from the high commodity prices driven mainly by sustained demand 
from China. What was initially perceived as an opportunity to promote economic take-off and 
translate it into development, on the contrary, actually involved becoming anchored in the recurrent 
Latin American economic pattern of exporting non-value-added products.
As a result, by the end of Rousseff ’s first term of government, Brazil had turned  towards a 
domestic consumption model, with a deep scarcity of domestic investments and technological 
progress, the absence of a foreign trade policy and only one dynamic sector going by itself: 
agribusiness. Far from granting greater autonomy at the international level or a desirable 
diversification of the export matrix, this repressing of exports generated a pendulum, causing 
China to replace the U.S.A. as Brazil’s preferred trading partner. In this sense, regardless of 
the partial maintenance of the universalist claim in foreign policy, the decline of Brazil as an 
emerging power during the Rousseff governments was shown by the BRICS’ protagonism shift 
3  Two concrete examples of this unprecedented global role were the fact that Brazil led the UN mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and 
partnered with Turkey to lead the negotiations on nuclear activities with Iran in 2010.
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to Russia and China, the drowning of the IBSA Trilateral Forum and a loss of weight in the 
country’s capacity to challenge or influence the international institutions, norms or agendas 
(Cervo and Lessa 2014).
At the regional level, the limits of the national development model were reflected in a 
breakdown of the governing coalitions, which generated two events with implications that went 
beyond the episodic. While, on the one hand, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff reverberated 
positively in Brazil through a reconfigured liberal-conservative alliance, Mauricio Macri’s victory 
in the Argentine presidential elections, on the other, constituted an interruption of twelve years 
of Peronist hegemony. In both cases, the respective heads of state were replaced in less than a year 
(from the end of 2015 to mid-2016), although the Argentinean transition of power was achieved 
through a fair democratic election, whereas the Brazilian one was the result of a highly controversial 
legal - yet hardly legitimated - process. These changes, far from being merely circumstantial, are 
causally related to an entrenched structural framework. Therefore, irrespective of the limited 
room for manoeuvre and capacity for agency at the Casa Rosada (Mauricio Macri at the time 
and Alberto Fernández since December 2019) and the Planalto (Michel Temer followed by Jair 
Bolsonaro since January 2019), their respective pragmatic foreign policy gambits, which are 
conditional on the achievement of an economic-commercial agenda, transcend the capacities of 
their own governments.
From this point of view, phenomena such as Brexit or the election of presidents such as Trump 
or Bolsonaro are not construed as circumstantial outcomes (and therefore as “unexpected episodic 
effects” or “black swans”), but instead are framed as constitutive causes; that is, as processes that 
shape — and reveal — a new ontology of world geopolitics. These realities should serve as the 
context within which to analyse both the logic governing Brazil’s foreign policy during Bolsonaro’s 
presidency and its relationship with the once widespread objective of promoting Latin American 
regionalism as a means of achieving greater autonomy in decision-making. As some scholars have 
noted (Caballero and Arbiol 2018), since the inauguration of Argentine President Macri and the 
Brazilian impeachment which installed Temer, we have been witnessing an acceleration of pragmatic 
reductionism in the region’s foreign policies, with Brazil being a case in point. Eventually, the 
perfect storm of economic crisis, social disaffection, and an absence of charismatic presidential 
leadership would lead to deliberately reductionist, short-termist and economically-orientated 
foreign policies, guided by two maxims as a road map: attracting foreign investment and promoting 
exports, as stated by Dilma’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mauro Vieira4. In this context, instead of 
seeking autonomy to make decisions that promote national development, foreign policy decisions 
are limited to “rescue” and damage control measures in response to various crisis and obstacles. 
The aim is no longer to increase autonomy, but rather to adhere to policies that minimise the 
damage of an eminently adverse and hostile international structure.
4 Speech by Minister Mauro Vieira on the ceremony of the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs’ transfer of authority (Ministério das 
Relações Exteriores 2015).
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Therefore, whether we interpret a break or a continuity in the notion of autonomy as linked 
to the project of national development, it is vital to revisit the relational component of the concept, 
in the sense of serving national interests through a relationship with the dominant power. The 
strategic game of approximation to/distancing from the hegemonic power configures what Lima 
views as one of the essential paradigms necessary to understand Brazilian foreign policy from a 
historical perspective: the conflict between Americanists and globalists (Lima 1994). However, this 
does not mean that these two conflicting paradigms are to be applied in absolute terms or that 
governments order their priorities solely according to either one or the other. On the contrary, 
there is a huge variety of approaches that fall between these two extremes and which combine 
various perspectives depending on the field of action and the geographical space in which Brazilian 
foreign policy is to be applied. Additionally, the new spaces of possibility which open up for 
certain medium-sized actors within a hypothetical context of power transition from the U.S.A. 
to China must also be taken into account.
Therefore, while on the one hand the pragmatism of Rousseff ’s government seemed to 
constitute a departure from Silva’s conceptualisation of autonomy, Temer’s government took 
advantage of this redirection and sought to align itself with this understanding of autonomy 
through an Americanist reading of international relations. In this context, highly polarised elections 
took place between the PT candidate, Fernando Haddad, and the conservative Jair Bolsonaro, 
supported by the BBB coalition at the National Congress (“bullet” - the armament faction -, 
“beef ” - the rural faction -, and “bible” - the evangelical faction). Thus, the new Brazilian right 
designed an electoral strategy that altered the electoral scheme, dominated by the alternation of 
PSDB, PMDB and PT parties.
To do this, Bolsonaro structured his program around three factors: (a) a strong neoliberal 
orientation and the consequent withdrawal of the state from the economy, (b) a conservative 
social behaviour control, based on the safeguard of ‘Western and Christian’ values (notably, in 
the field of sexual, religious, cultural and educational orientation against ‘cultural Marxism’ and 
‘gender ideology’); and (c) a critique of democracy and the political party system, combined with 
nostalgia for authoritarian ages and their values (Santos and Tanscheit 2019, 157). The political 
alliances that founded Bolsonaro’s candidacy in 2018 were reflected in his ministerial structure, 
organised around three key categories: (a) anti-globalist readings, concentrated around the self-
named governmental philosopher, Olavo de Carvalho; (b) the nationalist military perspective, 
defined by its vice-president, retired general Hamilton Mourão; and (c) the neoliberal arm, defined 
by the technocrats Paulo Guedes, Minister of Economy, and Sergio Moro, Minister of Justice and 
Public Order (Chagas-Bastos 2019, 96). 
In this vein, Bolsonaro’s government seems to have transcended the limits which had held 
back previous governments more fully committed to the Americanist paradigm (arguably those of 
Dutra, Castelo Blanco and Collor de Mello). In other words, using Jaguaribe’s terminology, it is 
a case of activating the exercising element with which peripheral countries can attain autonomy: 
taking advantage of a favourable intra-imperial relationship generated by an ethnic-cultural 
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identification with the values of the hegemonic centre. In short, the notion of Brazil as a privileged 
ally of the hegemonic power and the guardian of Latin America in the name of Christian Western 
civilisation. In other words, the particular actions of Bolsonaro and his circle are framed in an 
agency dimension where the challenging and irreverent language, as well as the climate of constant 
polarisation, become elements of mass mobilisation and personal support. On the other hand, 
this way of acting only fertilises in an environment in which the structural narrative is explained 
by the alleged decline of the Western civilising pillars in a scenario of economic crisis and, even 
more importantly, a crisis of values, where the priority would be to reinforce the Western Christian 
order to consequently strengthen Brazil. For instance, the aforementioned agency and structural 
features of Brazilian foreign policy are embodied in the explicit harmony with Donald Trump.
Nevertheless, the objective of “re-engaging with the world” (one that Argentine president 
Macri posited) by means of a favourable intra-imperial relation — namely, alignment with the 
U.S.A. —, contains a diagnostic error: the global context on which it is premised no longer exists. 
Bolsonaro’s foreign policy is informed by his binary and myopic reading of world politics. The 
resulting foreign policy assumes an ideological alignment with the vision of the world contained 
in Trumpism, even if this worldview involves a degree of Latin American isolation. This vision 
has strengthened Brazil, whose interpretation of it has been consolidated ideationally by Olavo 
de Carvalho, who provides the theoretical justification of anti-globalist political movement, and 
on the pragmatic level by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ernesto Araújo, who was appointed 
by Carvalho; Eduardo Bolsonaro, the president of the Comissão de Relações Exteriores e de Defesa 
Nacional (Foreign Affairs and National Defence Commission of the Chamber of Deputies) and 
leader of Steve Bannon’s far-right political movement in Latin America (The Movement), and 
Bolsonaro’s international affairs advisor, Filipe Martins. 
As already observed, after Celso Amorim’s (2003-2010) longevity and high-profile as Brazilian 
Foreign Minister, the rapid successions of Patriota (2011-13), Figueiredo (2013-15), Vieira (2015-
16), Serra (2016-17), Nunes (2017-2019) and Ernesto Araújo (2019-) illustrate various agential 
factors. On the one hand, from the institutional point of view, a lack of continuity in the design of 
Itamaraty’s foreign policy can be witnessed. On the other, from the individual point of view, we can 
discern an attitude on the part of these ministers in which foreign policy merely serves to mitigate 
the effects of Brazil’s commercial isolation, while simultaneously promoting an unprecedentedly 
low international profile with the intention of minimising the damage to Brazil’s reputation in 
the eyes of the world, caused by cases of corruption (Caballero 2019a). In stark contrast to the 
previous “globalist” period, the context in which Bolsonaro and his chancellor Araujo’s operate 
illustrates what Frenkel (2018) calls “Americanism” and “de-Americanisation,” in the sense that 
the former implies a privileged relationship with the United States, while the latter involves a 
distancing from the region as a whole. 
Brazilian foreign policy during recent years seems to corroborate the notion that, far from 
aspiring to a greater degree of autonomy in relational terms, as proposed by Hurrell, the capacity 
for agency is, for the most part, subordinated to other factors. An analysis of these limitations is 
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determined by a disquisition between two plausible scenarios. On the one hand, one potentially 
fruitful line of enquiry might be to examine whether the lack of leadership and presidential 
political capital (as proposed by Burges) is the main “agential” impediment, despite the fact that 
the current structural conditions (the so-called enabling requirements in Jaguaribe’s terminology) 
might serve to increase Brazil’s autonomy. 
On the other hand, a second scenario might give credibility to the notion that it is systemic 
change itself, of a structural nature, that makes attaining any degree of autonomy impossible. In 
other words, once more following Jaguaribe’s typology, neither national viability (Brazil experiencing 
economic crisis and a powerful socio-institutional disaffection), nor international permissiveness 
(in an increasingly protectionist world immersed in a kind of crisis of globalisation), would allow 
agential exercising requirements to be autonomously implemented. Against this backdrop, it is 
possible to interpret the unconditional unity that Jair Bolsonaro exhibits with Trump’s strongly 
ideologised policies as, perhaps, the intention to foster a kind of benevolent “intra-imperial” 
relationship. 
In spite of the fact that both scenarios previously mentioned can coexist to a certain degree, 
the first is premised on a conjunctural understanding of the current situation which emphasises 
the role of agents in the development of foreign policy. However, it does not seem to be the case 
that the shifts which take place obey the same episodic swing of the pendulum or that presidential 
elections are determined by passing circumstances. If this were the case, it could be expected that 
the election of future presidents and/or the dynamics of decision-making actors (Itamaraty, for 
example), would swing once more and reproduce a hypothetical tendency towards continuity in 
Brazil’s foreign policy.  
However, the present article maintains that the origins of the break run much deeper than 
the agency capacity or agential decision-making of individual presidents and diplomats. Instead, 
the causation of the break must be understood in terms of a reversal of more deeply-rooted trends 
within what can be thought of as systemic changes of a structural nature. An ongoing crisis in 
globalisation is producing changes in the global context (Sanahuja 2017). Additionally, the still 
unknown extent of the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic throughout 2020 must also be factored 
into the equation, something that some analysts have already begun to explore.5 
In summary, the structural nature of these changes compels us to understand autonomy 
in terms of breaks rather than as continuity. Additionally, the posture adopted by president 
Bolsonaro and his immediate circle seems to suggest that maximising the degree of autonomy, 
far from being an objective in itself, is in fact secondary and subordinated to an ideological 
agenda concerning the hegemonic power of the U.S.A., one that, more specifically, results 
from his alignment with Trump. Another reality that also needs to be acknowledged is the 
narrow understanding of foreign policy that indicates the adoption of a damage-limitation 
5 One example among many is Andrés Malamud (@andresmalamud), “¿Qué consecuencias tendrá la pandemia sobre la política internacional? 
Diez reflexiones exploratorias. HILO” Twitter, March 17, 2020, 12:35 pm. Access: 17th March, 2020. https://twitter.com/andresmalamud/
status/1239938378415706115, or Richard Haass’ article “The Pandemic Will Accelerate History Rather Than Reshape It” (Hass 2020).
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approach within an increasingly uncertain and hostile international political climate. 
We might, therefore, be in the midst of a process of dual break. On the one hand, there could a 
break more closely related to structural change whose starting point could be thought of occurring 
during Dilma’s second presidential term: the break from Lula da Silva’s ideal of autonomy (which 
was ground-breaking in itself ). On the other, a rupture more closely linked to the agential decision-
making process of the triad managing Brazil’s foreign policy (Araújo, E. Bolsonaro and Martins) 
and the impact of Bolsonaro’s presidential diplomacy. All in all, the efforts of these four actors 
are reflected in the break in Brazil’s behaviour and historic role at the multilateral level and the 
country’s adjustment to Planalto’s current priorities.
Conclusion
Growing uncertainty and an increase in unexpected phenomena can be witnessed in the 
current context, with many questions remaining unanswered. Such conjunctural understanding, 
in this instance, acquires a greater degree of importance as, not only are efforts being made 
to determine the scope for action of agents who are constrained by international structures, 
but we are also witnessing systemic change which is modifying the structures themselves as 
we know them. Following on from certain authors (Sanahuja 2017), the conjunction of a 
wide range of economic, social and political factors allows us to sketch out a context of “crisis 
in globalisation,” in combination with profound geopolitical shifts. Although we might not 
yet be capable of minutely characterising this budding new international paradigm, new 
trends are being imposed on the international economy (digitisation, relocation and capitalist 
resource depletion), in society (growing social disaffection, revision of the social contract 
and nostalgic — and nationalist — reinventions of non-existent pasts) and in international 
politics (a geopolitical turn from the United States to China, institutional delegitimisation 
caused by an inability to respond to global issues and the instrumentalisation of fears as a 
compass of political strategy).  
The quest for autonomy is a narrative that has been historically constructed in terms of 
Itamaraty’s continuity, and a guarantee of loyal adherence to several strands in Brazil’s foreign policy, 
independent of Planalto’s corresponding ideological outlook. However, as has been expounded in 
this article, the reality has been very different. While this narrative has masked the turns in the 
history of recent foreign policy and, more specifically, the disruptions derived from both agential 
(presidential diplomacy, foreign minister, power relations within Itamaraty) and structural regional 
and global shifts (post-Cold War, open regionalism, BRICS, post-liberal regionalism, globalisation 
crisis and reactionary nationalisms), the fact that, instead of continuity, it constituted the axis 
and fundamental vector of breaks in Brazilian foreign policy has also been blurred. Indeed, far 
from acting as cohesive or unifying elements, the diverse interpretations of autonomy and how 
to obtain it have caused and justified the various swings and breaks.
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This article has argued that we are witnessing a dual break. The first, due to the underlying 
trends that are redesigning the international world as we know it, is of a predominantly structural 
nature; the other, more agential in nature, is the product of president Bolsonaro’s particular worldview 
and inner circle. Both are effecting changes in the canon of presidential diplomacy in Brazil. Seen 
in this way, the key to understanding Brazil’s current foreign policy is the agential capacity of actors 
such as president Bolsonaro (including the “ideological redirection” in Itamaraty) and his attempt at 
“bandwagoning” with the Trump administration. But even more relevant is the erroneous reading 
of the structural framework. Moreover, this supposed agential pragmatism, to be utilised to obtain a 
favourable intra-imperial relationship in the current context of global uncertainty, does not in itself 
produce either an intra-hegemonic relational autonomy or the situational autonomy applied by Vargas.
This simplistic and populist strategy, bolstered by the alignment with Washington, lacks the 
incisiveness to detect the systemic change which has been taking place during recent years and 
which has become manifest in the current crisis of globalisation. It is these enabling requirements 
that must be rethought and incorporated into Brazilian national interests in order for the country’s 
search for autonomy to be more fruitful. Namely, Brazil should prioritise attaining a reduction 
in its degree of dependence on external actors and interests and an increased capacity to advance 
national development goals, which is the ultimate objective of foreign policy.
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